• UK Gov logo, 50% resolution.png

    Reminder of change


    In less than a week the OFSI Consolidated List of Asset Freeze Targets is closing.

    From 09:00 GMT on Wednesday 28 January 2026 the UK Sanctions List will be the only source for all UK sanctions designations. There will be no changes to the structure of the current UK Sanctions List.

    You should use this period to prepare any systems for the formal closure of the OFSI Consolidated List.

    A guidance page is available to help you prepare for the change, with a supporting webinar recording.

    A format guide for the UK Sanctions List is available, which includes mappings to the fields on the OFSI Consolidated List.

    Communications:

    Guidance Page
    UKSL Format Guide

    The UK Sanctions List from FCDO lists which people, entities and ships are designated or specified under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, and why.

    The OFSI Consolidated List from HMT provides information relating to asset freeze and investment ban targets across all financial sanctions regimes implemented in the UK. This list will close at 09:00GMT on Wednesday 28 January 2026. Guidance has been published to help you prepare for the change

    Find out more about UK Sanctions and how to contact us here: UK sanctions – GOV.UK

    This is a joint announcement from: 

    Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office // Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation // Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation 

  • Today, OFAC issued Iran General License T, entitled “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions and the Offloading of Cargo Involving Certain Persons or Vessels Blocked on January 23, 2026.”

    Why? Because:

    Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related General License

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Escalates Pressure on Iranian Regime for Killing Peaceful Protestors

    Additions:

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [IRAN-EO13902] Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran

    AAYAT SHIP MANAGEMENT PRIVATE LIMITED

    • Address: India
    • Party Type: entity
    • Target Type: Shipping Company

    Supplemental Information: Aayat Ship Management Private Limited is the owner, operator, and manager of the Comoros-flagged vessel AVON.

    BENOIL SHIPPING INC

    • Address: Liberia
    • Party Type: entity
    • Target Type: Shipping Company

    Supplemental Information: Benoil Shipping Inc is the owner of the Panama-flagged vessel AQUA SPIRIT.

    BLACK STONE OIL AND GAS

    • Address: Oman
    • Party Type: entity
    • Target Type: Shipping Company

    Supplemental Information: Black Stone Oil and Gas is the owner, manager, and operator of the Palau-flagged vessel AL DIAB II.

    GALERAN SERVICE CORP

    • Address: Seychelles
    • Party Type: entity
    • Target Type: Shipping Company

    Supplemental Information: Galeran Service Corp is the owner of the Palau-flagged vessel CESARIA.

    HORIZON HARVEST SHIPPING LLC

    • Address: United Arab Emirates
    • Party Type: entity
    • Target Type: Shipping Company

    Supplemental Information: Horizon Harvest Shipping LLC manages and operates the Palau-flagged vessel SEA BIRD.

    LONGEVITY SHIPPING LIMITED

    • Address: Marshall Islands
    • Party Type: entity
    • Target Type: Shipping Company

    Supplemental Information: Longevity Shipping Limited is the owner and manager of the vessel LONGEVITY 7.

    ODYSSEY MARINE INC.

    • Address: Marshall Islands
    • Party Type: entity
    • Target Type: Shipping Company

    Supplemental Information: Odyssey Marine Inc. is the owner of the Palau-flagged vessel EASTERN HERO.

    TRADE BRIDGE GLOBAL INC.

    • Address: Marshall Islands
    • Party Type: entity
    • Target Type: Shipping Company

    Supplemental Information: Trade Bridge Global Inc. is the owner, manager, and operator of the Comoros-flagged vessels CHIRON 5 and KEEL.

    The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [IRAN-EO13902] Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran

    AL DIAB II (Palau Flag)

    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9053816
    • Party Type: vessel
    • Linked to: BLACK STONE OIL AND GAS

    Supplemental Information: The AL DIAB II transported multiple shipments of Iranian LPG to Pakistan and Somalia in 2025.

    AQUA SPIRIT (Panama Flag)

    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9197727
    • Party Type: vessel
    • Linked to: BENOIL SHIPPING INC

    Supplemental Information: The AQUA SPIRIT has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian petroleum products, including LPG, to Pakistan and other locations since 2025.

    AVON (Comoros Flag)

    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9034705
    • Party Type: vessel
    • Linked to: AAYAT SHIP MANAGEMENT PRIVATE LIMITED

    Supplemental Information: The AVON transported multiple shipments of Iranian LPG to Bangladesh and Pakistan in 2025.

    CESARIA (Palau Flag)

    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9251602
    • Party Type: vessel
    • Linked to: GALERAN SERVICE CORP

    Supplemental Information: The CESARIA has transported millions of barrels of Iranian crude oil to East Asia since late 2025.

    CHIRON 5 (Comoros Flag)

    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9306665
    • Party Type: vessel
    • Linked to: TRADE BRIDGE GLOBAL INC.

    Supplemental Information: The CHIRON 5 has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian naphtha since 2025.

    EASTERN HERO (Palau Flag)

    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9353905
    • Party Type: vessel
    • Linked to: ODYSSEY MARINE INC.

    Supplemental Information: The EASTERN HERO has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian high sulfur fuel oil since 2025.

    KEEL (Comoros Flag)

    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9176929
    • Party Type: vessel
    • Linked to: TRADE BRIDGE GLOBAL INC.

    Supplemental Information: The KEEL has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian naphtha since 2025.

    LONGEVITY 7 (Unknown Flag)

    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9240885
    • Party Type: vessel
    • Linked to: LONGEVITY SHIPPING LIMITED

    Supplemental Information: The LONGEVITY 7 transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian clean condensate received via a ship-to-ship transfer. It also carried multiple cargoes of Iranian methanol in 2022 and has operated as part of the Iranian shadow fleet since at least 2020.

    SEA BIRD (Palau Flag)

    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9088536
    • Party Type: vessel
    • Linked to: HORIZON HARVEST SHIPPING LLC

    Supplemental Information: The SEA BIRD has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian liquified petroleum gas (LPG) to East Asia, Djibouti, and the UAE.

  • So, I asked Gemini:

    What considerations should go into the design of a sanctions testing program? List sources and justify your choices

    And it replied:

    Designing a robust sanctions testing program requires balancing regulatory expectations (effectiveness) with operational reality (efficiency). The goal is to prove that your screening controls are working as intended and are aligned with your institution’s specific risk profile.

    Below are the critical design considerations, categorized by the testing lifecycle, followed by authoritative sources and justifications.

    1. Key Design Considerations

    A. Governance and Scope

    • Independence: The testing function (e.g., Internal Audit or an independent third party) must be separate from the function responsible for setting the screening parameters to ensure objectivity.
    • Frequency & Triggers: Design the program to test not just annually, but also upon “trigger events” (e.g., new product launches, major system updates, or significant changes to sanctions lists).
    • End-to-End Coverage: Testing should not be limited to the software logic. It must cover the entire lifecycle: from data extraction (source systems) to the final disposition of an alert by an analyst.

    B. Data Integrity (Inputs)

    • Completeness & Lineage: Verify that all relevant data (customer names, counter-parties, vessel names, payment instructions) is actually making it from the source system to the screening engine. Dropped fields are a common failure point.
    • Data Quality: Assess the quality of the data being screened. Are there dummy values (e.g., “N/A”, “Unknown”) that might bypass screening logic?
    • List Management: Verify that the internal “Block Lists” (e.g., OFAC SDN, EU, UN) are updated timely. Test the “time-to-deployment” gap between a regulator’s update and your system’s update.

    C. Screening Logic & Model Validation (Processing)

    • Fuzzy Matching & Thresholds: Test the sensitivity of your algorithm.
      • Exact Match: Does it catch “Iran”?
      • Fuzzy Match: Does it catch variations like “Tehran,” “Ir@n,” or specific misspellings?
      • Justification: If the threshold is too high (e.g., 95%), you miss risks. If too low (e.g., 60%), you drown in false positives.
    • Good Guy/White Lists: specific attention must be paid to “suppression rules.” Ensure that rules designed to auto-close false positives are not accidentally auto-closing true matches (e.g., a rule to ignore “Cuba, Missouri” must not ignore “Cuba” the country).
    • Segmentation: Ensure different business lines (e.g., Trade Finance vs. Retail Banking) have appropriate rules. Trade finance often requires stricter, keyword-based screening compared to retail customer databases.

    D. Operational Effectiveness (Outputs)

    • Alert Adjudication: Test a sample of “Cleared” alerts to ensure the rationale for discounting them was sound and documented.
    • System availability: Verify that the system processes transactions in real-time (if required) without timeouts that could allow a sanctioned transaction to slip through during an outage.

    2. Sources and Justifications

    To defend your program design to regulators or auditors, you should cite the following hierarchy of sources:

    1. OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control)

    • Source Document: A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments (2019).
    • Justification: This is the primary regulator for US sanctions. OFAC explicitly lists “Testing and Auditing” as one of the five essential components of a compliance program. They emphasize that a failure to test the “effectiveness” of the program is a root cause of many enforcement actions. Using their framework is the best defense against a penalty calculation.

    2. The Wolfsberg Group

    • Source Document: Wolfsberg Guidance on Sanctions Screening (2019).
    • Justification: This represents the global banking industry’s “gold standard” for best practices. It provides specific technical guidance on “fuzzy matching,” data quality, and the limitations of screening that regulators often accept as a reasonable benchmark for commercial feasibility.

    3. NYDFS (New York Department of Financial Services)

    • Source Document: Part 504 (Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program Requirements).
    • Justification: Even if you are not NY-regulated, Part 504 is widely viewed as the most prescriptive and rigorous standard in the US. It explicitly mandates “end-to-end, pre- and post-implementation testing,” including data mapping and model validation. Adhering to Part 504 standards usually ensures you are over-compliant with federal standards.

    4. FFIEC (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council)

    • Source Document: BSA/AML Examination Manual – OFAC Section.
    • Justification: This is the “playbook” examiners use when they visit your institution. Designing your testing program to mirror the procedures in this manual ensures you are testing for exactly what the examiners will look for (e.g., validating that the bank processes list updates quickly).

    Do you quibble with any of this? It seems like a reasonable starting point…

  • Counter Narcotics Designations

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Sanctions One of the Caribbean’s Largest Narcotics Traffickers and His Network

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059] Illicit Drug Trade Sanctions

    MC DONAL RODRIGUEZ, Anita Yorleny

    • AKA: MCDONALD RODRIGUEZ, Anita
    • Address: Limon, Costa Rica
    • DOB: 04 Oct 1974
    • Nationality: Costa Rica
    • Gender: Female
    • Cedula No.: 701120514 (Costa Rica)
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: PICADO GRIJALBA, Luis Manuel

    Supplemental Information: Anita Yorleny Mc Donal Rodriguez is the mother-in-law of Luis Manuel Picado Grijalba (“Shock”). She used her businesses to launder money for Shock and notarized fraudulent transactions on his behalf.

    MC DONALD RODRIGUEZ, Estefania

    • AKA: MCDONALD RODRIGUEZ, Estefania
    • Address: Costa Rica
    • DOB: 09 Apr 1992
    • Nationality: Costa Rica
    • Gender: Female
    • Cedula No.: 702100887 (Costa Rica)
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: PICADO GRIJALBA, Luis Manuel

    Supplemental Information: Estefania Mc Donald Rodriguez is the wife of Luis Manuel Picado Grijalba (“Shock”). She used her businesses to launder money for Shock and facilitate his drug trafficking operations.

    PENA RUSSELL, Tonny Alexander

    • AKA: PEÑA RUSSELL, Tonny Alexander
    • Address: Limon, Costa Rica
    • DOB: 29 Dec 1987
    • Nationality: Costa Rica
    • Gender: Male
    • Cedula No.: 701820333 (Costa Rica)
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: PICADO GRIJALBA, Luis Manuel

    Supplemental Information: Tonny Alexander Pena Russell controls a gang of sicarios (hitmen) that allied with Shock and Noni. He was arrested in 2024 and charged with 78 counts of murder, many of which were carried out on Shock’s orders.

    PICADO GRIJALBA, Jordie Kevin

    • AKA: “Noni”
    • Address: Limon, Costa Rica
    • DOB: 19 May 1993
    • Nationality: Costa Rica
    • Gender: Male
    • Cedula No.: 702200042 (Costa Rica)
    • Party Type: individual

    Supplemental Information: Jordie Kevin Picado Grijalba, known as “Noni,” is a leader of the trafficking network and brother to Luis Manuel Picado Grijalba. He is responsible for importing cocaine to Costa Rica and storing it. Noni was arrested in Costa Rica in August 2025 and is held pending extradition to the United States.

    PICADO GRIJALBA, Luis Manuel

    • AKA: “Shock”
    • Address: Limon, Costa Rica
    • DOB: 22 Dec 1981
    • Nationality: Costa Rica
    • Gender: Male
    • Cedula No.: 801190098 (Costa Rica)
    • Party Type: individual

    Supplemental Information: Luis Manuel Picado Grijalba, known as “Shock,” is the leader of the network and one of the most prolific drug traffickers in the Caribbean. He is responsible for importing cocaine to Costa Rica and storing it. Shock was arrested in the United Kingdom in December 2024 and is held pending extradition to the United States.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [ILLICIT-DRUGS-EO14059] Illicit Drug Trade Sanctions

    3-101-507688 SA

    • Address: Limon, Costa Rica
    • Tax ID No.: 3-101-507688 (Costa Rica)
    • Linked to: MC DONALD RODRIGUEZ, Estefania

    Supplemental Information: This company is operated by Estefania McDonald to facilitate Shock’s criminal activities. It has been temporarily suspended by Costa Rican authorities due to its links to money laundering and drug trafficking.

    ASOCIACION DE LIDERES LIMONENSES DEL SECTOR PESQUERO

    • AKA: “ASOLIPES”
    • Address: Limon, Costa Rica
    • Tax ID No.: 3-002-384913 (Costa Rica)
    • Linked to: MC DONAL RODRIGUEZ, Anita Yorleny

    Supplemental Information: Operated by Estefania McDonald and Anita McDonald, this entity was designated for being owned or controlled by Anita McDonald Rodriguez. It has been temporarily suspended by Costa Rican authorities due to its links to money laundering and drug trafficking.

    CELAJES DE YORK CDY SA

    • Address: Limon, Costa Rica
    • Tax ID No.: 3-101-313254 (Costa Rica)
    • Linked to: MC DONALD RODRIGUEZ, Estefania

    Supplemental Information: This company is operated by Estefania McDonald to facilitate Shock’s criminal activities.

    INVERSIONES LAURITA L AND L SA

    • AKA: INVERSIONES LAURITA L&L SA
    • Address: San Jose, Costa Rica
    • Tax ID No.: 3-101-703720 (Costa Rica)
    • Linked to: MC DONALD RODRIGUEZ, Estefania

    Supplemental Information: This company is operated by Estefania McDonald to facilitate Shock’s criminal activities. It has been temporarily suspended by Costa Rican authorities due to its links to money laundering and drug trafficking.

    MAGIC ESTHETIC SALON SA

    • Address: San Jose, Costa Rica
    • Tax ID No.: 3-101-800676 (Costa Rica)
    • Linked to: MC DONALD RODRIGUEZ, Estefania
    • Linked to: MC DONAL RODRIGUEZ, Anita Yorleny

    Supplemental Information: This company is operated by Estefania McDonald and Anita McDonald to facilitate Shock’s criminal activities.

    Press Chart: PRESS CHART – Picado Grijalba Costa Rican Drug Trafficking Network

  • I initially asked:

    Assume you are a sanctions officer. Besides the obvious (countries subject to targeted sanctions only), what sources would you use to assess third parties’ geographic risk? How would those sources help identify low-risk, moderate-risk and high-risk countries?

    and got back this response:

    As a Sanctions Officer, I operate under the assumption that sanctions lists tell you where the fire is, but geographic risk data tells you where the smoke is blowing.

    Most modern sanctions violations do not happen directly with a sanctioned country (e.g., Iran or Russia); they happen through a “clean” third country that serves as a transshipment hub or financial conduit.

    To assess this “shadow risk,” I rely on five specific data sources outside of the standard sanctions lists. Here is how I use them to build a Low/Moderate/High risk model.

    1. The Financial Backbone: FATF Lists

    The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identifies jurisdictions with weak anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) controls.

    • Source: FATF “High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action” (Black List) and “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring” (Grey List).
    • The Logic: If a country cannot police money laundering, it cannot police sanctions evasion. Sanctions evaders flock to these jurisdictions to wash funds.
    • Risk Classification:
      • High Risk: FATF Black List (e.g., Myanmar). Treat as functionally sanctioned.
      • Moderate Risk: FATF Grey List (e.g., South Africa, Vietnam). Requires Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) to verify source of funds.
      • Low Risk: FATF Member countries with compliant Mutual Evaluation Reports.

    2. The Corruption Proxy: Transparency International (CPI)

    Corruption is the grease that moves sanctioned goods across borders. Customs officials in highly corrupt regimes can be bribed to falsify End-User Certificates (EUCs) or ignore “ghost shipments.”

    • Source: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
    • The Logic: There is a direct correlation between low CPI scores and high diversion risk. A “clean” country on paper with a CPI score below 30 is a high-risk jurisdiction for export controls.
    • Risk Classification:
      • High Risk: CPI Score < 30 (e.g., Turkmenistan, Venezuela). Assumption of government complicity in illicit trade.
      • Moderate Risk: CPI Score 30–50. Frequent facilitation payments but not necessarily state-sponsored evasion.
      • Low Risk: CPI Score > 60. Strong rule of law.

    3. The Diversion Hubs: BIS & Trade Data

    The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the EU publish alerts on “Transshipment Hubs”—countries that are friendly allies but are used by adversaries to bypass sanctions.

    • Source: BIS “Common High Priority Items” AlertsFinCEN Joint Alerts, and trade flow data (e.g., Import/Export spikes).
    • The Logic: If a country’s imports of semiconductors increased by 400% immediately after Russia invaded Ukraine, that country is a diversion hub.
    • Risk Classification:
      • High Risk: Known transshipment hubs for dual-use goods (e.g., Turkey, UAE, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia). Note: These are often “friendly” nations, making them dangerous blind spots.
      • Moderate Risk: Major logistics hubs with high volume but strong enforcement (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong—though Hong Kong risk is rising).
      • Low Risk: Countries with strict export control alignment (e.g., UK, Japan, Australia).

    4. The Ownership Veil: Tax & Secrecy Indices

    Sanctioned entities use shell companies to hide ownership. We need to know which countries make it easy to hide the “Ultimate Beneficial Owner” (UBO).

    • Source: Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index or the EU List of Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes.
    • The Logic: If a jurisdiction allows bearer shares or does not maintain a public corporate registry, we cannot verify the 50% Rule (ownership by sanctioned parties).
    • Risk Classification:
      • High Risk: Jurisdictions with high secrecy scores and no public registry (e.g., certain Caribbean offshore centers).
      • Moderate Risk: Jurisdictions with registries but limited access/validation.
      • Low Risk: Jurisdictions with fully transparent, searchable UBO registries (e.g., most EU member states).

    5. The Future Indicator: Human Rights Reports

    Sanctions are increasingly thematic (e.g., Global Magnitsky Act). Today’s human rights violator is tomorrow’s SDN (Specially Designated National).

    • Source: US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices or Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Reports.
    • The Logic: Doing business with state-owned enterprises in authoritarian regimes carries a high risk of future designation.
    • Risk Classification:
      • High Risk: “Not Free” status with reports of forced labor (e.g., Xinjiang region relevance).
      • Moderate Risk: “Partly Free” with civil unrest.
      • Low Risk: “Free” with stable democratic institutions.

    Summary: The Risk Matrix

    As your Sanctions Officer, I would combine these sources into a weighted score to automate our third-party risk assessment.

    Risk LevelIndicators (Composite)Action Required
    High RiskFATF Grey/Black List OR CPI < 30 ORKnown Transshipment HubCompliance Veto. Transaction requires C-level approval and verified End-User Certificate.
    Moderate RiskCPI 30–50 OR Tax Haven OR Political InstabilityEnhanced Due Diligence. Must obtain full ownership structure (UBO) and negative news screening.
    Low RiskFATF Member, CPI > 60, Strong Export ControlsStandard Screening. Automated list matching only.

    But I also knew there were other data sources, perhaps less frequently used – so I asked Gemini whether or not they should be included in the model. The first one that came to mind was the OECD country risk data, honestly. Ultimately, we got a more complete model:

    Here is the consolidated Comprehensive Geographic Risk Framework.

    This framework integrates financial crime data (FATF, TI) with macro-political indices (OECD, World Bank, EIU) to create a “Defense in Depth” model. It moves beyond simple sanctions list matching to identify the underlying environmental risks—corruption, authoritarianism, and lack of rule of law—that enable sanctions evasion.

    Part 1: The Consolidated Source List

    We use these nine authoritative sources to triangularize risk. No single source is sufficient; together, they cover the full spectrum of compliance and commercial risk.

    A. The “Hard” Legal & Financial Gates

    1. Sanctions Lists (OFAC/UK/EU/UN): The absolute legal baseline. (Target: Sanctioned Jurisdictions)
    2. FATF Lists (Financial Action Task Force): The global standard for Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing controls. (Target: Illicit Finance Hubs)
    3. BIS & Trade Data: Alerts on transshipment hubs and dual-use goods diversion. (Target: Sanctions Evasion Routes)

    B. The “Soft” Environmental Indicators

    4. Transparency International (TI) CPI: Measures public sector corruption. (Target: Bribery & Facilitation)

    5. OECD Country Risk Classifications: Assesses country credit risk and likelihood of sovereign payment default. (Target: Economic Stability)

    6. World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): Specifically “Rule of Law” and “Political Stability.” (Target: Legal Enforceability)

    7. EIU Democracy Index: Classifies regime types from Democracy to Authoritarian. (Target: Future Sanctions Risk)

    8. Human Freedom Index (Cato/Fraser): Measures economic and personal liberty. (Target: Business Environment/Capital Controls)

    9. Tax Justice Network / EU Tax Lists: Identifies secrecy jurisdictions. (Target: Hidden Ownership/Shell Companies)


    Part 2: The Integrated Risk Model

    This model applies a “Weakest Link” logic (also known as “The Worst Score Wins”). If a country flags as “High Risk” on any primary trigger, the entire jurisdiction is treated as High Risk, regardless of how well it scores on other metrics.

    Risk ClassificationPrimary Triggers (Automatic Classification)Secondary Indicators (Aggravating Factors)Operational Restrictions
    PROHIBITED
    (The Black List)
    Sanctions: Embargoed Countries (Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, etc.)
    FATF: Black List (High-Risk Jurisdictions)
    N/ANo Trade.
    Immediate exit. Block all transactions.
    HIGH RISK
    (The Red Zone)
    FATF: Grey List (Jurisdictions under increased monitoring)
    TI CPI: Score < 30
    OECD Risk: 6 or 7
    EIU: “Authoritarian Regime”
    Tax: Non-Cooperative / High Secrecy Score
    BIS: Known Transshipment Hub
    Executive Veto Required.
    Requires C-Level approval, verified End-Use Certificates (EUC), and independent audit rights.
    MODERATE RISK
    (The Amber Zone)
    TI CPI: Score 30–50
    OECD Risk: 3 to 5
    World Bank WGI: Bottom 50th Percentile
    EIU: “Hybrid Regime” or “Flawed Democracy”
    Human Freedom:Bottom Quartile (Economic Freedom)
    Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD).
    Mandatory “look-back” on partners, ownership (UBO) verification, and negative news screening.
    LOW RISK
    (The Green Zone)
    FATF: Member / Compliant
    TI CPI: Score > 60
    OECD Risk: 0 to 2
    EIU: “Full Democracy”
    World Bank WGI: Top 25th Percentile
    Standard Screening.
    Automated watch-list screening only. Business as usual.

    Part 3: Methodology & Threshold Derivation

    You asked specifically how we determined the “cut-off” points for High, Medium, and Low risk. These thresholds are not arbitrary; they are derived from statistical correlations with financial crime and industry benchmarks for “risk appetite.”

    1. Why is the Transparency International (TI) Cut-off at 30?

    • The Derivation: The TI CPI scales from 0 (Highly Corrupt) to 100 (Very Clean).
    • The Logic: In the FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) compliance community, a score below 30 is widely viewed as the threshold for “Systemic Corruption.”
      • < 30 (High Risk): Corruption is institutionalized. You likely cannot do business without paying a bribe (e.g., to clear customs or get a permit). This creates immediate legal liability.
      • 30–50 (Moderate Risk): Corruption exists but is often transactional rather than systemic. You can navigate it with strong controls.
      • > 60 (Low Risk): Generally indicates strong rule of law and functioning institutions.

    2. Why use the OECD 0-7 Scale?

    • The Derivation: The OECD Export Credit Group classifies countries to set minimum insurance premiums for export credits.
    • The Logic: This is a proxy for economic collapse, which often precipitates political crises and sanctions.
      • 6-7 (High Risk): Indicates a high probability of sovereign default or inability to service debt. Countries in financial collapse often resort to illicit trade to generate hard currency.
      • 0-2 (Low Risk): These are “Investment Grade” economies. The risk of sudden regime change or capital controls is minimal.

    3. Why the EIU “Democracy Index”?

    • The Derivation: The Economist Intelligence Unit categorizes regimes into four types based on electoral process, civil liberties, and functioning of government.
    • The Logic: This is our Predictive Metric.
      • “Authoritarian Regimes”: These governments are the primary targets of Western sanctions (e.g., Russia, Belarus, Venezuela). If you invest heavily here, you risk your assets becoming “stranded” by future sanctions.
      • “Full Democracies”: Almost never sanctioned by the US/EU/UK.

    4. Why “The Worst Score Wins”?

    In risk management, positive attributes do not cancel out negative ones.

    • Example: The UAE has a high OECD rating (wealthy, stable economy) but has been gray-listed by FATF (money laundering concerns).
    • Result: We treat it as High/Moderate Risk. The wealth of the country does not negate the fact that it is a hub for illicit finance. We cannot let a “Green” score on one index hide a “Red” flag on another.
  • Report for Licensing Activities Undertaken Pursuant to the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA)

    The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has released a Quarterly Report of Licensing Activities pursuant to Section 906(b) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), covering activities undertaken by OFAC under Section 906(a)(1) of the TSRA from July through September 2025. Under the procedures established in its TSRA-related regulations, OFAC processes license applications requesting authorization to export agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran under the specific licensing regime set forth in Section 906 of the TSRA.

    OFAC TSRA Program Information Page

    Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) text

    , , ,
  • Counter Terrorism Designations and Designations Removals

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Exposes and Disrupts Hamas’s Covert Support Network

    Additions:

    The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Specially Designated Global Terrorist

    BIRAWI, Zaher Khaled Hassan

    • AKA: “Abu Hasan”
    • Address: United Kingdom
    • DOB: Oct 1961
    • POB: Asira al-Shimaliya Village, West Bank, Palestinian Territories
    • Nationality: Palestinian
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: individual
    • Linked to: POPULAR CONFERENCE FOR PALESTINIANS ABROAD

    Supplemental Information: Zaher Khaled Hassan Birawi is a United Kingdom-based individual who serves as a senior official of the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA). He is a member of its General Secretariat and one of the organization’s founding members. The PCPA General Secretariat provides executive leadership and direction to the group, which functions as a front organization for Hamas.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Specially Designated Global Terrorist

    AL-FALAH SOCIETY GAZA

    • AKA: AL FALAH BENEVOLENT SOCIETY
    • AKA: AL-FALAH CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION
    • Address: Gaza
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 1999
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: Al-Falah Society Gaza claims to provide humanitarian services but is funded by and provides monetary support to Hamas. It has directly transferred money to the Hamas military wing, including over $2.5 million in funding over a recent three-year period.

    AL-NUR SOCIETY GAZA

    • AKA: AL NOOR PRISONER SOCIETY
    • AKA: AL-NUR PRISONER ASSOCIATION
    • AKA: EL-NUR SOCIETY
    • AKA: JAMA’IT ELANUR AL-KHIRIYA
    • Address: Gaza
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2001
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: Al-Nur Society Gaza is integrated into Hamas’s military wing. Funds from Al-Nur are used to pay Hamas military wing members as well as provide services to Hamas fighters.

    AL-SALAMEH SOCIETY GAZA

    • AKA: AL-SALAMA CHARITABLE SOCIETY FOR THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED AND DISABLED
    • AKA: “AL-SALAMEH SOCIETY”
    • Address: Gaza
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2006
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: Al-Salameh Society Gaza is organized by and integrated into Hamas’s military wing. Members of Hamas’s internal security forces are formally assigned to work in this organization. It is tasked and funded by Hamas to provide support for the organization and complete projects intended to benefit Hamas.

    MERCIFUL HANDS GAZA

    • AKA: MERCIFUL HANDS CHARITY
    • AKA: THE MERCIFUL HANDS CHARITABLE SOCIETY
    • AKA: “MERCIFUL HANDS ASSOCIATION”
    • Address: Gaza
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2005
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: Merciful Hands Gaza is controlled by the Hamas military wing. Some of its funding, as well as specific instructions for its operations, are provided by the Hamas military wing.

    POPULAR CONFERENCE FOR PALESTINIANS ABROAD

    • Address: Beirut, Lebanon; Istanbul, Turkey
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2017
    • Organization Type: Advocacy organization
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: The Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad (PCPA) is a front organization for Hamas that operates in accordance with Hamas directives. It was established and managed by operatives from Hamas’s Bureau of International Relations. The PCPA is a main organizer of flotillas seeking to break the security cordon around Gaza and is used by Hamas to clandestinely expand its political influence.

    QAWAFIL SOCIETY GAZA

    • AKA: QAWAFIL ALKHAIR ASSOCIATION
    • Address: Gaza
    • Website: https://qawafilalkhair.net
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2015
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: Qawafil Society Gaza is organized by and integrated into Hamas’s military wing. It is tasked and funded by Hamas to provide support for the organization and complete projects intended to benefit Hamas.

    WAED CAPTIVE AND LIBERATORS SOCIETY

    • AKA: VAED ASSOCIATION FOR PRISONERS AND RELEASED PERSONS
    • AKA: WAED SOCIETY GAZA
    • Address: Al-Sina’a Street, Gaza
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2006
    • Organization Type: Other human health activities
    • Target Type: Charity or Nonprofit Organization
    • Linked to: HAMAS

    Supplemental Information: Waed Captive and Liberators Society is organized by and integrated into Hamas’s military wing, with members of Hamas’s internal security forces formally assigned to work there. It receives funding directly from Hamas to execute Hamas projects in Gaza and is tasked by the military wing to advocate on behalf of captured Hamas fighters.

    Delistings:

    The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Programs:

    • [SDGT] Specially Designated Global Terrorist
    • [IFSR] Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations

    ALTOMARE S.A., 5 Aitolikou, Piraeus 18545, Greece; Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886; Organization Established Date 10 Dec 2001; Identification NumberIMO 5033025; Registration Number 999902991 (Greece) (Linked To: SEPEHR ENERGY JAHAN NAMA PARS COMPANY).

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Specially Designated Global Terrorist

    KALLISTA (3E3407) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886; Vessel Year of Build 2010; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9411965; MMSI 352001127 (vessel) (Linked To: ALTOMARE S.A.).

    , ,
  • After I asked about what questions to ask in order to draft a sanctions policy, Gemini asked me if it should draft a Risk Appetite statement… why not?

    Based on the questions identified in the previous step, I have drafted a Sanctions Risk Appetite Statement.

    For this draft, I have adopted a “Managed Risk” profile. This assumes the company is a global operator willing to do business in complex, non-sanctioned emerging markets (accepting some operational friction) but maintains a zero-tolerance stance for willful violations or dealings with comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions.


    Draft: Sanctions Risk Appetite Statement

    Owner: Global Compliance / Chief Sanctions Officer

    Audience: Board of Directors, Executive Leadership, Business Units

    1. Overall Statement of Principle

    The Company is committed to complying with all economic sanctions and trade embargoes administered by the United States (OFAC), the United Nations, the European Union, and the United Kingdom.

    While the Company pursues growth in emerging markets, we prioritize regulatory compliance and reputational integrity over commercial opportunity. We will not engage in any transaction that risks violating strict liability sanctions regimes, nor will we engage in “gray zone” activities that are legally permissible but plainly contradict the foreign policy intent of our primary regulators.

    2. Jurisdictional Risk Appetite

    • Prohibited Jurisdictions (Zero Tolerance): The Company will not engage in any direct or indirect business, sales, or services involving comprehensively sanctioned countries or regions (currently including, but not limited to, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and the occupied regions of Ukraine).
    • High-Risk Jurisdictions (Conditional Tolerance): The Company accepts the risk of operating in countries subject to partial or sectoral sanctions (e.g., Venezuela, Russia) only under the following conditions:
      1. The specific activity is explicitly authorized by a General License or is exempt.
      2. Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) has confirmed the absence of blocked parties.
      3. Legal Counsel has provided a written non-objection.

    3. Counterparty Risk & Screening

    • SDN / Blocked Persons: We have zero tolerance for transacting with individuals or entities appearing on the OFAC SDN List, the EU Consolidated List, or the UK Sanctions List.
    • 50% Rule / Ownership: We will treat any entity owned 50% or aggregate by blocked persons as blocked, regardless of whether the entity itself is named on a list.
    • Indirect Risk: We accept a low tolerance for “facilitation risk.” We will not sell to distributors if we identify a significant risk of diversion to a sanctioned end-user. We reserve the right to audit distributor end-user logs.

    4. Product & Sectoral Controls

    • Dual-Use Goods: For products with potential military application, we accept no risk of diversion. End-Use Certificates (EUCs) are mandatory for all sales of sensitive technology in high-risk regions.
    • Sectoral Sanctions: We will strictly adhere to debt and equity restrictions (e.g., OFAC SSI List). We will not extend credit terms exceeding regulatory limits (e.g., 14 days, 30 days) to sectoral targets.

    5. US Nexus & Recusal (Facilitation)

    To protect the Company and its employees, we enforce a strict Recusal Policy:

    • No US Person (citizen, permanent resident, or person physically in the US) may approve, facilitate, or support any transaction involving a target of US sanctions, even if that transaction is legal for a foreign subsidiary under local law.
    • If a transaction is legal for a foreign subsidiary but prohibited for the US parent, the decision must be ring-fenced entirely outside the United States.

    6. Governance & Exception Authority

    • Standard Risk: Approvals for standard transactions in low-risk jurisdictions are delegated to the Sales and Operations teams.
    • High Risk: Transactions involving high-risk jurisdictions or “red flag” resolutions require approval from the Chief Sanctions Officer.
    • Policy Exceptions: Any deviation from this Risk Appetite Statement requires unanimous approval from the Chief Legal Officer and the CEO.

    How this document functions:

    This document protects you. If a sales executive proposes a deal in a gray-area jurisdiction that promises high revenue but high risk, you can point to Section 1, which the Board has signed, to veto the deal without it becoming a personal argument.

    A good starting point, methinks…

  • My prompt to Gemini:

    Assume you are a newly-hired chief sanctions officer, and the company has no sanctions policy. What questions would you ask the board and the C-suite officers to drive your policy and your risk assessment?

    Its response:

    As the newly appointed Chief Sanctions Officer, my primary goal is to align the sanctions compliance program with the organization’s strategic vision and risk appetite. To build a policy and risk assessment that is both robust and commercially viable, I need to understand the “tone from the top” and the reality of our operations.

    Here are the critical questions I would pose to the Board and C-suite, categorized by their impact on the program.

    1. Risk Appetite & Strategic Tolerance

    To the Board and CEO:

    • What is our tolerance for regulatory friction versus commercial growth? Are we a “zero-tolerance” organization that exits any market with even a hint of sanctions risk, or are we willing to manage complex risks in authorized but highly sanctioned jurisdictions (e.g., relying on General Licenses)?
    • How do we view “reputational risk” compared to strict legal liability? Would we continue to do business with a legally non-sanctioned entity if they were publicly linked to a sanctioned regime in the press, or would we self-sanction to protect the brand?
    • What is our stance on facilitation risk? Specifically, are we comfortable with our foreign subsidiaries doing business that we, as a parent company, cannot touch, or do we apply a single global standard regardless of local law?

    2. Business Exposure & Footprint

    To the Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Head of Sales:

    • Where is our growth coming from in the next 12-36 months? Are we targeting expansion in high-risk regions (e.g., Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or Asia-Pacific) that might trigger sectoral sanctions or export controls?
    • Who are our “critical” counterparties? Beyond customers, who are the distributors, joint venture partners, or supply chain nodes we cannot operate without?
    • Do we have visibility into the end-users of our products? If we sell through distributors, do we have the contractual rights and audit capabilities to know where the goods actually end up?

    3. Products & Technical Controls

    To the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and Product Heads:

    • Do our products or services have dual-use potential? Could our software or hardware be repurposed for military or surveillance use, potentially triggering Export Administration Regulations (EAR) alongside sanctions?
    • Where is our data stored and who has access to it? If we have support teams in third countries accessing US-based servers, are we inadvertently “exporting” controlled technical data?
    • How flexible are our current ERP and payment systems? If a new sanction is imposed tomorrow, can we systematically block a region or a counterparty instantly, or is it a manual process?

    4. Governance & Resources

    To the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and General Counsel:

    • What is the budget for screening tools and external counsel? Do we have the resources to automate daily screening against updated lists (OFAC, UK HMT, EU, UN), or are we relying on periodic manual checks?
    • What is the escalation path for a blocked transaction? Does the business have the authority to override a compliance “hold,” and if so, who signs off on that risk?
    • How do we handle voluntary self-disclosure? If we find a historical violation during my initial risk assessment, is the leadership team prepared to disclose it to regulators to mitigate penalties, or is the preference to remediate quietly?

    Summary of Intent

    These questions serve two purposes:

    1. Calibration: They tell me if I need to build a “fortress” compliance program (highly restrictive, low risk) or a “facilitative” program (risk-managed, high complexity).
    2. Education: They force the leadership to acknowledge that sanctions compliance is not just a legal check-box, but a strategic constraint on how and where we do business.

    And its justification of the sources it used:

    To validate the questions I posed in my initial response, I have mapped them below to the specific, authoritative industry frameworks from which they were derived. These are not hallucinations; they are the foundational documents used by US and international regulators to evaluate compliance programs.

    Here are the sources, categorized by the questions they informed.

    1. Source for “Risk Appetite & Management Commitment”

    Question context: Asking the Board about tolerance for regulatory friction and “tone from the top.”

    • Primary Source:“A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments” (Published by the US Dept. of Treasury, May 2019).
      • Validation: This is the definitive guidance from OFAC. It explicitly lists “Management Commitment” as one of the five essential components of a compliance program. It states that senior management must “ensure that the SCP receives adequate resources” and “legitimize the program.”
      • Specific Reference: Section I (Management Commitment) and Section II (Risk Assessment).
    • Secondary Source:“Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs” (US Dept. of Justice, Criminal Division, Updated September 2024).
      • Validation: The DOJ uses this document to decide whether to prosecute companies. It asks prosecutors to evaluate: “How have senior leaders, through their words and actions, encouraged or discouraged compliance?”

    2. Source for “Technical Controls & Screening”

    Question context: Asking about “fuzzy logic,” data quality, and screening tools.

    • Primary Source:“Wolfsberg Guidance on Sanctions Screening” (The Wolfsberg Group, 2019).
      • Validation: The Wolfsberg Group is the global standard-setter for financial crime compliance. Their guidance specifically addresses “fuzzy matching,” data integrity, and the calibration of screening tools to avoid false negatives.
      • Specific Reference: Section 3 (Technology) and Section 4 (Alert Generation).

    3. Source for “Ownership & The 50% Rule”

    Question context: Asking about “indirect risk” and joint ventures.

    • Primary Source:OFAC “Entities Owned by Blocked Persons” Guidance (The 50% Rule) (Feb 2008 / Revised Aug 2014).
      • Validation: This is a strict liability rule, not just a guideline. It states that any entity owned 50% or more in the aggregate by sanctioned persons is automatically sanctioned, even if not named on a list.
      • Specific Reference: OFAC FAQs 398–403.

    4. Source for “Export Controls & Dual-Use Goods”

    Question context: Asking about product diversion and end-users.

    • Primary Source:“Export Compliance Guidelines: The Elements of an Effective Export Compliance Program” (Bureau of Industry and Security – BIS).
      • Validation: BIS regulates dual-use goods (commercial items with military applications). Their guidelines emphasize “Cradle-to-Grave” security—knowing the ultimate end-use of a product, not just the initial buyer.
      • Specific Reference: Element 2 (Continuous Risk Assessment) and Element 8 (Program for Handling Export Violations).

    5. Source for “Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD)”

    Question context: Asking if the leadership is prepared to disclose historical violations.

    • Primary Source:OFAC Enforcement Guidelines (31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A).
      • Validation: This legal text defines how penalties are calculated. It explicitly lists “Voluntary Self-Disclosure” as a mitigating factor that can reduce base penalties by up to 50%.
      • Specific Reference: General Factor F (Remedial Response) and General Factor I (Cooperation with OFAC).

    Summary of Validation

    The questions I proposed were not invented; they were reverse-engineered from these regulatory expectations. If a company cannot answer “Yes” or provide data for these questions, they are effectively compliant-deficient according to the OFAC Framework and DOJ Guidelines.

  • Counter Terrorism Designations and Designation Update

    Treasury Press Release: Treasury Increases Pressure on Houthi Smuggling and Illicit Revenue Generation Networks

    Additions:

    The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

    ADRISS, Ahmad

    • AKA: أحمد إدريس
    • DOB: 05 Jan 1986
    • POB: Tartous, Syria
    • nationality: Syria
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: 015638373 (Syria) expires 21 Aug 2028
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.

    AL MUAYYAD, Adil Mutahhar Abdallah

    • DOB: 20 Aug 1975
    • nationality: Yemen
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: 03856973 (Yemen) expires 06 Apr 2016
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: A Yemeni businessman who has played a key role in the establishment and operations of Barash Aviation and Sama Airline, working alongside Muhammad Al-Sunaydar to facilitate Houthi aviation and procurement schemes.

    AL-MATARI, Ebrahim Ahmed Abdullah

    • AKA: إبراهيم أحمد عبد الله المطري
    • DOB: 01 Jan 1988
    • POB: Sana’a, Yemen
    • nationality: Yemen
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: 04514597 (Yemen) expires 12 Mar 2017
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ALBARRAQ SHIPPING CO

    Supplemental Information: Designated for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, Albarraq Shipping Co, which has an interest in the vessel ALBARRAQ Z.

    AL-SHARAFI, Zayd ‘Ali Ahmed

    • AKA: AL-SHARAFI AL-AZRAQ, Zaid ‘Ali Yahiya
    • Address: Sana’a, Yemen
    • DOB: 15 Mar 1989
    • POB: Al Hudaydah Governorate, Yemen
    • nationality: Yemen
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: 13398992 (Yemen)
    • alt. Passport: RE0138931 (Saint Kitts and Nevis)
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Uses his businesses, including Yemen-based Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives and Al-Sharafi Oil Companies Services, to import and export oil for the Houthi-led government. He maintains multiple vessels used to transfer oil to the Houthis and is affiliated with Dubai-based Janat Al Anhar General Trading LLC.

    ASGHAR, Imran

    • Address: 27 28 Jumeirah Park, District 6, St F, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • DOB: 19 Dec 1962
    • POB: Lahore, Pakistan
    • nationality: Pakistan
    • alt. nationality: Iran
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: BM1828063 (Pakistan) expires 19 Oct 2032
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ARKAN MARS PETROLEUM DMCC

    Supplemental Information: An Iranian national and owner of Alsaa Petroleum and Shipping FZC. He facilitates financial transactions between the Iranian government and Houthi-affiliated oil companies and uses Alsaa as a front company for Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC.

    BAIDHANI, Waleed Fathi Salam

    • AKA: ALBAIDHANI, Waled Fatehi Salem
    • AKA: SALM, Walid Fathi
    • Address: Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • DOB: 27 Aug 1980
    • nationality: Yemen
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Identified as the owner of Adeema Oil FZC and involved with Al Sharafi Oil Companies Services, which are major Houthi oil and gas facilitators based in the UAE receiving financial support from the Iranian government.

    BSEIS, Ahmad

    • AKA: أحمد بسيس
    • DOB: 03 Jan 1990
    • POB: Hama, Syria
    • nationality: Syria
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: 013802819 (Syria) expires 26 Jan 2026
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.

    DAHAN, Ameen Hamid Mohammed

    • AKA: امين حميد محمد دحان
    • Address: Oman; Yemen
    • DOB: 20 Sep 1974
    • nationality: Yemen
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: 09375789 (Yemen) expires 02 Feb 2026
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: RABYA FOR TRADING FZC

    Supplemental Information: The Oman-based director and beneficial owner of Rabya for Trading FZC. He used his company’s warehouse in Oman’s Al-Mayzunah Free Market Zone to assist Wadi Kabir in concealing 52 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles for transport into Yemen.

    ISMAIL, Ahmad

    • AKA: أحمد إسماعيل
    • DOB: 01 Jan 1994
    • POB: Tartous, Syria
    • nationality: Syria
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: N00560431 (Syria) expires 01 May 2030
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.

    PSHENICHNYY, Alexander Yurovich

    • AKA: ПШЕНИЧНЫЙ, Александр Юрьевич
    • Address: Russia
    • DOB: 11 Sep 1982
    • POB: USSR
    • nationality: Russia
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: 763380800 (Russia) expires 05 Sep 2030
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.

    SINGH, Ranveer

    • Address: India
    • DOB: 12 Feb 1983
    • POB: Ranchi, India
    • nationality: India
    • Gender: Male
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Passport: Z6920651 (India) expires 16 Aug 2032
    • Party Type: (individual)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Designated for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.

    The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

    ADEEMA OIL FZC

    • AKA: ADIMA OIL
    • Address: PO Box 233599, No. 639 Ghurair Building, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Website: www.adeema.com
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 18 Sep 2011
    • License: 5006759 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: A major Houthi oil and gas facilitator based in the UAE, owned by Waleed Fathi Salam Baidhani, that receives financial support from the Iranian government.

    AL SHARAFI OIL COMPANIES SERVICES

    • AKA: AL-SHARAFI OIL
    • AKA: AL-SHARAFI OIL FOR IMPORTING PETROLEUM DERIVATIVES
    • Address: Sana’a, Yemen
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Commercial Registry Number: 2/34074 (Yemen)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: A company used by Zayd Al-Sharafi to import and export oil for the Houthi-led government.

    ALBARRAQ SHIPPING CO

    • Address: Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Majuro, Ajeltake Island 96960, Marshall Islands
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 23 Apr 2025
    • Identification Number: IMO 0237669
    • Business Registration Number: 131338 (Marshall Islands)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Owned or controlled by Ebrahim Ahmed Abdullah Al-Matari and holds an interest in the crude oil tanker ALBARRAQ Z.

    AL-RIDHWAN EXCHANGE AND TRANSFER COMPANY

    • AKA: شركة الرضوان للصرافة والحوالات النقدية
    • AKA: AL-RADWAN EXCHANGE AND TRANSFERS CO.
    • AKA: AL-RIDHWAN EXCHANGE COMPANY
    • Address: Al-Nasr Street, Sana’a, Yemen; Hodeidah, Yemen; Saada, Yemen
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 27 Mar 2019
    • Commercial Registry Number: 6478/21 (Yemen)
    • License: 347/2019 (Yemen)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: A Sana’a-based, Houthi-affiliated exchange house overseen by Houthi procurement official Muhammad Ahmad Al-Talibi. It facilitates payments for Houthi weapons procurement and militant activities, including smuggling operations from Iran and Djibouti.

    ALSAA PETROLEUM AND SHIPPING FZC

    • AKA: ALSA COMPANY
    • AKA: ALSAA
    • AKA: ALSAA PETROLEUM & SHIPPING
    • AKA: ALSAA PETROLEUM & SHIPPING FZC
    • Address: PO Box 124024, No. 702 Reef Tower, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Website: www.alsaagroup.com
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 10 Nov 2002
    • License: 5000343 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Registration Number: 11401539 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Linked to: ARKAN MARS PETROLEUM DMCC

    Supplemental Information: Owned by Iranian national Imran Asghar, this company acts as a main UAE-based, Iran-affiliated facilitator for financial transactions between the Iranian government and Houthi oil companies. It also serves as a front company for Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC.

    BARASH AVIATION AND CARGO COMPANY LIMITED

    • AKA: BARASH AVIATION
    • Address: Sana’a, Yemen
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2012
    • Organization Type: Freight air transport
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: Established by Houthi-aligned businessman Muhammad Al-Sunaydar, this air cargo company has assisted Houthi efforts to purchase commercial jet aircraft for transporting illicit cargo through Sana’a International Airport. It recently attempted to partner with Viktor Bout to purchase aircraft.

    NEW OCEAN TRADING FZE

    • AKA: NEW OCEAN INTERNATIONAL TRADING FZE
    • AKA: NEW OCEAN TRADING AND IMPORT COMPANY
    • Address: Hamriyah Business Center, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2019
    • Organization Type: Wholesale and retail trade
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: A commercial entity providing logistical support to the Houthis. It acted as an agent for a Yemeni company procuring military equipment and imported communications devices, technical systems, and computers.

    RABYA FOR TRADING FZC

    • AKA: شركة رابيا ااتجارة شركة منطقة حرة
    • AKA: “BASSAM AL-SAEEDI AND PARTNERS FREE ZONE COMPANY”
    • AKA: “BASSAM AL-SAEEDI AND PARTNERS FZC”
    • AKA: “RABIA COMPANY”
    • Address: Al Mayzunah, Dhofar, Oman
    • Website: www.agefzc.com
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 08 Jul 2018
    • Commercial Registry Number: 1322360 (Oman)
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: An Oman-based shipping and logistics firm directed by Ameen Hamid Mohammed Dahan. It used its warehouse in the Al-Mayzunah Free Market Zone to assist Wadi Kabir Co. in concealing 52 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles for smuggling into Yemen.

    SAMA AIRLINE

    • AKA: طيران سما
    • Address: Sana’a, Yemen
    • Website: https://www.samaairline.com
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 2023
    • Organization Type: Passenger air transport
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: A sister company to Barash Aviation established by Houthi leaders to generate revenue via passenger service from Sana’a International Airport. It was also involved in attempts to purchase commercial aircraft with Viktor Bout.

    WADI KABIR CO. FOR LOGISTICS SERVICES

    • AKA: شركة الوادي الكبير للخدمات اللوجستية
    • AKA: AL-WADI AL-KABIR COMPANY
    • AKA: ALWADI KABIR CO
    • AKA: WADI AL-KABIR COMPANY
    • Address: Sana’a, Yemen; Raysut, Oman
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: Nov 2020
    • Organization Type: Transportation and storage
    • Linked to: ANSARALLAH

    Supplemental Information: A Sana’a-based shipping facilitator with a branch in Oman that has conducted weapons smuggling for the Houthis. It owns warehouses and trucks in Yemen used to coordinate illicit shipments and attempted to smuggle 52 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles in 2022.

    The following vessel has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

    ALBARRAQ Z (D604006)

    • Vessel Type: Crude Oil Tanker
    • Vessel Flag: Unknown flag
    • Former Vessel Flag: Comoros
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Vessel Year of Build: 2003
    • Vessel Registration Identification: IMO 9252943
    • MMSI: 620800006
    • Party Type: (vessel)
    • Linked to: ALBARRAQ SHIPPING CO

    Supplemental Information: Identified as property in which Albarraq Shipping Co has an interest.

    Amendments:

    The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

    OFAC Program: [SDGT] Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 594

    JANAT AL ANHAR GENERAL TRADING LLC

    • AKA: ABU SUMBOL GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
    • AKA: ابو سمبل للتجارة العامة ش.ذ.م.م
    • AKA: JANAT ALANHAR GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
    • AKA: جنة الانهار للتجارة العامة ذ.م.م
    • AKA: JANAT AL-ANHAR TRADING COMPANY
    • AKA: JANNAH AL ANHAR GENERAL TRADING LLC
    • Address: PO Box 86973, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; Deira Al Riqqa, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
    • Secondary sanctions risk: section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886
    • Organization Established Date: 06 Sep 2000
    • alt. Organization Established Date: 23 Dec 2021
    • Commercial Registry Number: 1654359 (United Arab Emirates)
    • License: 1016292 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Chamber of Commerce Number: 383851 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Business Registration Number: 521012 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Economic Register Number (CBLS): 10803911 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Linked to: AL-JAMAL, Sa’id Ahmad Muhammad

    Supplemental Information: Janat Al Anhar is the new operating name of Abu Sumbol General Trading L.L.C. following its designation for support to Iran-based Houthi financial facilitator Sa’id al-Jamal. It is used by UAE-based companies to make payments to Houthi-affiliated oil companies.

    List of Changes:

    • Field Name: Name
      • Changed: ABU SUMBOL GENERAL TRADING L.L.C to: JANAT AL ANHAR GENERAL TRADING LLC
    • Field Name: AKA
      • Added: JANAT AL ANHAR GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
      • Added: JANAT ALANHAR GENERAL TRADING L.L.C
      • Added: جنة الانهار للتجارة العامة ذ.م.م
      • Added: JANAT AL-ANHAR TRADING COMPANY
      • Added: JANNAH AL ANHAR GENERAL TRADING LLC
    • Field Name: Organization Established Date
      • Added: 23 Dec 2021 (as alt. Organization Established Date)
    • Field Name: Commercial Registry Number
      • Added: 1654359 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Field Name: License
      • Added: 1016292 (United Arab Emirates)
    • Field Name: Chamber of Commerce Number
      • Added: 383851 (United Arab Emirates)
    , ,